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Abstract 
 
Although analyzed in terms of criteria for defining an optimum 
currency area, we could appreciate that EU fulfils certain criteria 
established within the theory of the optimum currency area. But in 
comparison with USA or Canada, the EU has less premises to 
effectively become such an area. The Economic and Monetary Union 
considered, from a certain point of view, the most ambitious and 
risky project of the European construction, is the result of a 
fundamental political decision within a powerful economic 
component. Despite the statute of sub-optimum currency area, there 
are still a series of arguments, both supportive and critical, for the 
settlement of an Economic and Monetary Union within the European 
space. 
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 The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas is based on the 
contribution of Robert Mundell, the pioneer of specific field 
researches (1961) – the issue being subsequently resumed by other 
economists, such as R. Mc Kinnon (1963), Kenen (1969) etc.  
 Mundell analyzed the criteria underlying an appropriate 
functioning of the Monetary Union ever since the European Monetary 
Union was still at the draft stage. We can presently state that the first 
researches related to the theory of the Optimum Currency Areas 
perceived very well the challenges to be faced by those countries 
which intend to form a monetary union, although the theory evolved 
along the way.  
 According to economists who studied the object matter of 
optimum currency areas, the criteria to be fulfilled by a certain 
country before its adhesion to a monetary union for the purpose of 
achieving sustainable macroeconomic balance are the following: 
1. Mundel (1961): Mobility of production factors. In the event 
the factors of production are mobile inside the countries which form a 
monetary union, a country experimenting adverse shocks might no 
longer be affected by unemployment and recession.  
2. McKinnon (1963): Degree of openness for an economy.  
McKinnon further argues that when a certain country experiments an 
opposing shock, in the event it is commercially integrated according 
to trade relations established with other countries of the Union, the 
destructive effects – unemployment and recession – should be felt to 
a lower extent. 
The degree of openness of an economy can be calculated in 
various ways, the most popular being (Exports + Imports)/Gross 
Domestic Product. 
The criteria elaborated by McKinnon raises the issue of 
dimensioning a currency area. The author argues that the optimum 
currency area is definitely not the entire world. It is rational that 
states such as USA, Japan, EU should have flexible exchange rates. 
Although a considerable number of commercial transactions are 
carried out between them, the weight of these trading operations in 
GNP (Gross National Product) of every state is insignificant. For 
instance, the USA trade with Western Europe represents only 2% of 
the GNP of USA. 
3. Kenen (1969): Degree of diversification of the production. 
The more diversified is the structure of the production generated by a 
country, the lower the costs incurred for abandoning the proper 
currency.  
Other criteria to be fulfilled by a country in order to adhere to 
monetary union incurring costs as low as possible are the following: 
 - Scitovsky (1958) and Ingram (1969, 1973): Financial 
integration. As countries become more integrated and financially 
driven within the Union, they find it easier to obtain funds for 
triggering production especially when they are facing adverse shocks. 
-  Fleming (1971): Similarity of inflation rates. The large 
differences between the inflation rates are dangerous when they are 
generated by structural differences in economy or caused by different 
policies. Yet, there are also differences deemed as conventional, for 
instance those due to Balassa-Samuelson effect which create 
inflationary pressures  until the catching-up process is complete. 
- The flexibility of prices and salaries, significant especially 
on short term (the faster the prices decrease the more rapidly the 
competitiveness of a country improves. 
- Political integration. It might be the most important 
precondition for an optimum currency area. 
Analysed in terms of criteria for defining an optimum currency 
area, EMU is characterized by a high mobility of capital (including a 
certain degree of real integration of capital markets), a great diversity 
of production, a high degree of commercial openness but a reduced 
mobility of the work force. 
The majority of the shocks which the European Union had to 
confront so far were symmetrical; nevertheless, the depth of 
specialization, which is a consequence of the establishment of the 
Single Market, shall determine the increase of probability that 
asymmetrical shocks might occur in the future. 
According to the definition formulated by Mundell, EU does not 
constitute an optimum currency area, mainly due to the reduced mobility 
of the “work force” factor. Actually, the mobility of this factor is 
more reduced in the European Union, even inside each Member 
State, as compared to the USA or Canada. However, the author of 
the theory regarding the optimum currency space, Mundell, is one 
of the fervent supporters of the idea of European monetary 
unification. 
As a whole, we could appreciate that EU fulfils certain 
criteria established within the theory of the optimum currency area, 
but in comparison with USA or Canada, the EU has less premises 
to effectively become such an area. Moreover, the absence of 
budgetary federalism in the EU constitutes a danger as budgetary 
transfers are considered one of the more appropriate adjustment 
mechanisms. 
As regards the criteria used by the theory of the optimum 
currency area, some economists (J.A. Frankel and A.K. Rose) raise 
the issue of the endogenous character of these criteria, reaching the 
conclusion that “a country might accomplish the criteria for 
entering a monetary union rather < ex post > than < ex ante >”1. 
Therefore, in the event the criteria used (degree of commercial 
openness, correlation of economic cycles, symmetry of shocks, 
mobility of the work force, system of fiscal transfers) are endogenous, 
the comparison of the European Union, made ex ante (meaning 
before the monetary unification), with the USA or Canada, 
considered ex post (that is after the monetary unification of these 
countries) has no sense. It results that the assessment of the success 
chances of the European Monetary Union and of its effects on the 
participating countries cannot be appropriately carried out, starting 
exclusively from the past situation of these countries. This 
happens as the structure of these economies undergoes important 
changes by their participation to the European Monetary Union. 
Theoretically, the effects of the economic integration are 
ambiguous: the development of the trade between participating 
countries fosters the synchronization of economic cycles, therefore 
reducing the probability that asymmetrical shock appear; at the same 
time, it encourages the depth of specialization which increases the 
probability that asymmetrical shocks occur. Yet, the empirical data 
analyzed by J.A. Frankel and A.K. Rose indicate very clearly that, as 
the degree of economic integration increases, the level of 
synchronization of the economic cycles advances also. Consequently, 
we can assume that the EU Member States shall accomplish a higher 
degree of synchronization of the economic cycles through their 
participation to the European Monetary Union, thus reducing the 
possibility that asymmetrical shocks occur. 
Other authors (such as B. Eichengreen) demonstrate that 
between the economic integration and the monetary integration lies 
a symbiotic relation, insofar the countries for which the creation of 
the Single Market determined significant boosting of the bilateral 
trade are also the best prepared countries for the monetary 
integration (participation to the Economic and Monetary Union)2. 
Therefore, we could state that the economic integration 
                                                 
1 Frankel J.A., Rose A. K., Is EMU More Justifiable Ex Post than Ex Ante?, 
European Economic Review, 41, 1997, p. 752- 760 
2 Eichengreen B., European Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice and Analysis, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1997. 
encouraged the preparation of the European countries for 
monetary integration. Conversely, it is known that, generally, the 
stability of exchange rates fosters the development of the 
international trade and that, as far as the European Union is 
concerned, the monetary integration, accomplished under the 
form of SME, really favoured the carrying out of the economic 
integration. These findings support the idea that the Economic and 
Monetary Union and the Single Market could form a ”vicious 
circle” which might lead to further economic and monetary 
integration into the EU. 
On the other hand, it is true that a single currency supposes 
the definitive loss of the autonomy of the national monetary policy. 
Actually, the national monetary policy entirely disappears being 
replaced by a common monetary policy. But in the case of the 
European Union, the loss if monetary sovereignty was a mere 
acknowledgement of a factual situation already created by the 
liberalization of capital movements, generated before the adoption 
of the single currency. 
Starting from the above mentioned “triad of 
incompatibilities” or the “impossible trinity” (incongruence between 
the free movement of capitals, the fixed exchange rates and the 
independent monetary policy), another author, P. Kauffmann, 
examines, in terms of the triad, the EU situation, showing that, for 
European countries, the monetary unification is the best option3 
among all possible solutions. 
The conclusions of the author cited are based on the 
following observations: 
a) Since 1991, the EU faces a perfect mobility of 
capitals which Europeans do not want to give up UE; 
b) For countries which are members of the EU, a clear 
preference is ascertained for the stability of exchange rates. The 
floating of the exchange rate reveals major disadvantages for EU 
(currency risk, uncertainty) which negatively affects the Single 
Market. On the other hand, the main theoretical advantage of 
floating systems - the automatic insurance of the external 
balance - has not been confirmed by the empirical studies 
carried out so far; on the contrary, the practice indicated that 
unbalances could maintain even in the case of floating 
exchange rates as a certain currency might be permanently 
overvalued or undervalued. 
                                                 
3 Kauffmann P., L`euro, Dunod, Paris, 1999, pg. 44-50. 
It results that the monetary union is the best solution for 
the European Union, even from a theoretical point of view: 
among the three incompatible elements, the autonomy of the 
monetary policy, which the European states had already “de 
facto” given up, namely when they decided to comply with the 
Bundesbank policy, has been sacrificed.  
Therefore, the adoption of the euro currency emerged as a 
natural choice, intervened under the circumstances of integration 
the European financial markets. Moreover, the single monetary 
policy has the advantage of taking into account the interests of all 
Member States, in contrast with the eventual imitation of the 
national monetary policy of one of the EU countries. 
The Economic and Monetary Union considered, from a 
certain point of view, the most ambitious and risky project of the 
European construction, is the result of a fundamental political 
decision within a powerful economic component. Despite the statute 
of sub-optimum currency area, there are still a series of arguments, 
both supportive and critical, for the settlement of an Economic and 
Monetary Union within the European space. 
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